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THE RIGIDITY OF THE RULE AGAINST
HEARSAY
By Epaphroditus Peck, Instructor in Evidence in the Yale Law
School.
The article by Governor Baldwin in the December (1911) YALEr,
LAW JOURNAL on "The Artificiality of Our Law of Evidence" is
an important contribution to the body of public and professional
opinion which demands a reconsideration and substantial reforma-
tion of our Law of Evidence.
Governor Baldwin has been for forty-two years a teacher of
law in Yale University; and for eighteen years in judicial service
as associate justice and chief justice of the Supreme Court of
Connecticut. He is therefore unusually competent to appreciate
the subject both from an academic and from a practical stand-
point.
Indeed, the fact which he mentions in the article, that "the
courts of Connecticut, in recent years, have gone farther than
those of most of our states, in the admission both of hearsay and
remote evidence, and leave it more to the discretion of the triatjudge", may well be due to judge Baldwin's own academic study
of the law, and to the fact that his predecessor as chief justice
was Professor of the Law of Evidence, and one of his associatejustices was and is Professor of the Law of Pleading, in this
law school.
The study of the law for the purpose of teaching its principles
and rules to an eager-minded and critical body of university
students necessarily leads to a somewhat deeper search into the
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philosophy, history, and logical soundness, of the detailed rules of
law than a judge is likely to give who has learned his law mostly
in the hurly-burly of practice, and is obliged to apply it under the
pressure of the court room.
The Anglo-American Law of Evidence was undergoing a
process of development and crystallization during the eighteenth
and the early decades of the nineteenth century. In the great
period of law reform just before and just after 185o it underwent
a striking and almost revolutionary change by the abolition of the
disability of parties, persons in interest, persons convicted of
crime, and atheists, to testify. Since then it has remained sub-
stantially unchanged.
But in 1889 Professor James Bradley Thayer 'began publishing
the results of his searching investigation into the history and
theory of the law of evidence in a series of articles in the
Harvard Law Review, which were afterward developed into his
"Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law," and the
results of which were made available for class-room use in his
case book.
This academic workof Professor Thayer laid the foundation
for the magnum opus of Professor Wigmore, in which Thayer's
critical and rationalizing point of view has been made accessible,
and indeed almost forced, by the very indispensableness of his
work to an active practitioner, upon the attention of lawyers and
judges.
Another professed follower of Professor Thayer is just now
publishing another monumental treatise, in which the necessity of
making more flexible the rules of evidence, and of increasing the
discretionary power of the trial judge, is the dominating idea.,
The influence of Professor Thayer's powerful exposition of his
ideas may be seen in such cases as Vincent v. Mutual Reserve
Fund Life Association, 77 Conn., 281, 58 Atl., 963, in which the
Supreme Court of Connecticut 6verruled a well established line
of decisions, expressly yielding to the force of his argument. It
is interesting to compare with this decision that of Re Cowdrey,
77 Vt., 359, 6o AtI., 141, in which the Supreme Court of Vermont
recognize the force of Professor Thayer's reasoning on the same
I The Modern Law of Evidence, by Charles Frederic Chamberlayne.
In four volumes; two already published. Albany, Bender & Company,
1911.
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subject, but hold that their own line of contrary decisions is too
firmly established to be now overthrown except by legislation, and
also Holt v. The United States, 218 U. S., 245, and Agnew v. The
United States, 165 U. S., 36, in which the Supreme Court of the
United States have practically abandoned their position taken in
Coffin v. The United States, 156 U. S., 432, which Professor
Thayer had so strongly condemned in his "Preliminary Treatise",
pages 337, 551-576. The thorough study of the rules of evi-
dence, and of their rationality or irrationality, which Professor
Thayer and his followers have made, have pretty completely over-
thrown the idea that they constitute a finished and perfect system,
-the finest product of the human intellect.
I wish here to discuss particularly the rigid rule of law .by
which hearsay must be excluded unless it comes within some
exception already established in the precedents.
It seems pretty evident that just as, in the middle of'the last
century, the rule of absolute exclusion of such witnesses as were
subject to some bias or discredit was changed to a mere liberty of
.showing the discrediting facts to affect the weight of their testi-
mony, the time is now approaching when the absolute exclusion
of hearsay testimony must be relaxed, and the trial judge be given
power to let such evidence go to the jury, when it is "the best
evidence of which the case in its nature is capable."
This would only be to return to the early course of development.
Professor Greenleaf, whose classical treatise began publication in
1842, attempted to establish the "Best Evidence Rule" as the basic
principle of the law of evidence. In this he was following the
lead of distinguished English judges.2 But the crystallizing ten-
dency of the law soon made the Best Evidence doctrine a plausible
explanation of some rules which had already become established,
but denied to present-day judges any power to extend that doc-
trine by the formulation of new rules.
When the judges of a century ago declared that, if the witness
who knew the facts in controversy was dead, insane, or beyond
the reach of process at the time of the trial, they would admit
evidence of his Testimony on a Former Trial between the same
Parties, his Dying Declarations upon the trial of one charged with
killing him, his Declarations against Interest, his Entries in Due
2 See chapter xi, page 484, of the "Preliminary Treatise"; and pages
778, 784-6, of Thayer's Cases in Evidence.
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Course of Employment, his Declarations as to Pedigree facts in
the family, or Public Facts affecting the community to which he
belonged,'and so on, they applied the general doctrine of admitting
the best available evidence to the particular cases of difficulty
which came before them, and made in each case an exception to
the general exclusion of hearsay.
But for sixty years past our judges have been obliged to say,
"There are six (or eight or ten, according ,to the classification
employed) exceptions to the rule against hearsay, and no more.
If your case does not come within one of these, we cannot admit
the evidence."
Why should not the judges of 1911 have as much power to,
establish exceptions to the hearsay rule as had their predecessors
of i8ii ?
The far greater learning of modern judges, the far higher intel-
ligence of modern juries, the far greater complexity of facts
involved in modem litigation, all call for the expansion of the
power of the trial judge to admit exceptional evidence in excep-
tional cases, and the abolition, or restriction to narrow limits, of
absolute and rigid rules of exclusion of evidence.
The Anglo-American law of evidence, which for the most -part
is, as Professor Thayer pointed out, a body of rules for the exclu-
sion of evidence which in its nature is relevant, can hardly be
accounted for or understood except as a result of the ancient con-
ception of the nature and duty of the jury.
That body of men was in the days when the English common
law was being formed a company of neighbors, whose duty it was
to inform the judge as to the fact in controversy by their own
knowledge, or by the information which they had received from
their forefathers or from the common opinion of the vicinage.
Witnesses outside the jury were at first called only to assist the
jury by giving them information to supplement that of the jurors
themselves. It was a most interesting process by which, in
course of time (and not of very ancient time, for the new con-
ception of the jury was not clearly stated until 1815; Thayer's
Preliminary Treatise, page 170), the duty of the jury has become
exactly the contrary of what it formerly was. Then the jury were
to decide the case wholly or chiefly by their own personal knowl-
edge, and to that end must be selected from the immediate neigh-
borhood, and their lack of knowledge of the matter in controversy
was a disqualification; now they must decide the case solely on the
RIGIDITY OF HEARSAY RULE
evidence given in court, it is usual to exclude any jurors who are
neighbors to either or both of the parties, and the fact that a
proposed juror has any preconceived opinion as to the merits of
the case constitutes an absolute disqualification except in very
exceptional cases.
When the jury. themselves, were supposed to have a thorough
knowledge of the case, or, if they had not, were expected to
inform themselves by inquiries in their respective neighborhoods,
it was natural that witnesses, called to assist and inform the jury,
should not be permitted to testify, if their own relation to the
case was such that their statements were less reliable than the
knowledge of the jury themselves. Unless witnesses of the most
reliable and disinterested character were available, the case had
better be left without witnesses to the jury, who reflected the
general opinion of the neighborhood. So neither the parties
themselves, their wives, nor anyone having an interest in the result
of the suit, was permitted to testify. This disqualification was
firmly established by i6oo A. D.
So also, if the best available witnesses had knowledge of the
matter only by hearsay or general reputation, it was better to
rely on the knowledge of the jurors, who were men of character
and under oath, and who could themselves supply the light to be
obtained from hearsay and reputation.
Mr. Chamberlayne puts the matter thus:
"The rule against hearsay, in its inception at least, constituted
a prohibition attaching to a witness rather than to the derivative
character of what he said. Under the early procedure a person
who could not state something to the jury which he had seen or
heard simply did not come within the class of persons designated
as witnesses. Neither he who could state only what some one
had told him nor the person who could say merely what he
inferred were witnesses, as the term was then understood. The
witness was required to swear that he would testify to what he
had seen and heard quod vidi et audivi, de visu suo et audito. The
witness must be voyant et oyant, by the Norman phrase of the
-year books. He could not infer, he could not report another's
observations. Hearsay and inference were alike excluded. The
short reason for this was that it was for the ancient jury, acting
still partly upon their own information, to do what reasoning was
deemed necessary and to use hearsay reputation, rumor, tradition
or whatever else might seem good in their eyes, as the basis of
their verdict. Inference and hearsay were denied to the witness
because these things were within the exclusive province of the
jury. The results of his perception alone the witness could prop-
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erly bring to that body as originally constituted. All the rest
they themselves were to furnish ;-such as general knowledge,
hearsay, their own private knowledge, including hearsay and
inferences from it, and the reasoning and conclusions involved in
comparing and digesting all that-they knew or heard from others."
Chaniberlayne on Evidence, Section 486.
It is evident that, while wholesale rules for the exclusion of
certain classes of witnesses, and certain kinds of testimony, may
have worked fairly well when the jury could fill up all gaps from
their own knowledge of the affair, or from the common opinion
of the neighborhood, when the character of the jury had changed
so that they had no personal knowledge of the matter in contro-
versy, the numerous rules of exclusion rendered it often impos-
sible to produce any admissible testimony whatever to prove an
undoubted cause of action. The rule, especially, which pro-
hibited any party or person interested in the result of the suit
from testifying made it impossible to prove in court any of the
innumerable causes of action which grow out of ordinary trans-
actions between man and man, not put in writing nor had in the
presence of witnesses.
This unsatisfactory state of the law was brought to America,
and continued to be the universal law until the middle of the nine-
teenth century.
Then came the great period of law reform in the middle of
the nineteenth century. How busily the process of reform legis-
lation was going on will appear from a few dates.
In 1846 the Constitution of New York was adopted which pro-
vided for a codification of the entire body of the law. In 1848
the first Code of Civil Procedure was adopted in New York,
which, among other reforms, abolished the disqualification of the
parties, and of those who had an interest in the suit, to testify.
In 1852 and 1854 the reformed Common Law Procedure Acts
were passed in England, and in 1852 the Practice Act of Massa-
chusetts. In 1848 the legislature of Connecticut abolished the
disqualification of parties interested in a suit, and persons convicted
of crime, to testify. In 1846 in Connecticut, and in 1848 in New
York, the first general acts for the protection of the property
rights of married women were passed.
The same class of legislation was going on in other parts of the
Union,'and soon after i85o the rules for the exclusion of inter-
-ested witneses had become practically obsolete. But no similar
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change took place in regard to the similar 
rules for the exclusion
of certain classes of testimony, such as hearsay. 
The exceptions
which had already been formulated by the 
courts were defined
with greater and greater exactness, and the 
rule of exclusion was
iron-clad except in the case of an established 
exception.
The difficulties caused by the absolute 
exclusion of hearsay
occur very much less often than did the 
difficulties caused by the
exclusion of interested witnesses; but they 
are no less serious in
their effect in the cases in which they 
do occur. Governor
Baldwin says, in the article which suggested 
the present one:
"Let us suppose that a man of the highest 
standing and character
is the only witness of a murder. He writes 
a statement of the
facts to the prosecuting officer. An indictment 
is found, but
before the case comes on for trial, he dies. 
No country not ruled
by 'Anglo-American law would exclude 
his written statement.
We would; and the murderer, in consequence, 
would probably go
f ree."
A'similar case may be suggested where 
the rule would work
equal unfairness on the other side. Suppose 
that a man is being
tried for murder on circumstantial evidence 
not absolutely con-
vincing. During the trial a felon in the 
penitentiary dies. 'Before
his death he calls for the prison chaplain, 
and confesses to him
that he committed the murder in question. 
The circumstances
of his confession are such as to entitle it 
to credence. Neverthe-
less it is hearsay; it comes within none 
of the exceptions to the
rule excluding hearsay, and it could not 
be admitted in behalf of
the accused in the murder trial.
A curious decision .by the Court of Appeals 
of New York in
i892 showed a narrow field not covered 
by any of the exceptions
relating to shop-books, which made it necessary 
for the court to
exclude evidence that any business man 
would consider of the
highest value and certainty, and thereby 
made it impossible for
the plaintiff to prove his cause of action. 
The executor of a
deceased private banker sued for money 
advanced to the defend-
ant by his testator. The court held that 
the bank's account books
were not admissible to prove the claim. 
If the banker had still
been alive, he could have testified to 
the transaction, and
"refreshed his memory" by reference to his books. If the
business had'been done by a clerk, the clerk 
could have testified
in the same manner; if the clerk had been 
dead, the book entries
Stithv. Rents, 131 N. Y., 169, 30 N. E., 54.
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made by him could have been proved as entries made in the-due course of employment; if the bank had been an incor-porated institution instead of a private bank, all its officers wouldhave been employees, and an entry, even by the president orgeneral manager, would have been admissible as an entry in duecourse of employment; if the entries had been of sales of mer-chandise instead of loans of money, they would have been admis-sible under the "shop-book rule." But the shop-book rule didnot apply, because it covers (in New York) only merchandiseentries and not those relating to dealings in cash; the rule as toentries in due course of employment did not apply because thebookkeeper was not an employee, but a proprietor; and he couldnot refresh his memory by examining the books and thereupongive his own testimony, because he was unfortunately dead.Such a decision in the greatest commercial State in the Unionis a discredit to the law; and the argument by which it is.attempted to defend the reasonableness of the rule is not muchmore satisfactory than the decision itself. The Court says: "Thesame necessity does not exist in respect to cash transactions.They are usually evidenced by notes or writing or vouchers inthe hands of the party paying or advancing the money. It wouldbe unwise to extend the operation of the rule admitting the party'sbooks in evidence beyond, its present limit, as would be the case,we think, if books containing cash dealings were held to be com-'petent." This statement that cash transactions are usually evi-denced by notes or vouchers, and that therefore, there is nonecessity to bring the books of a bank within the shop-book rule,is rather amazing, when one considers that the millions of dollars,daily deposited in New York banks are all evidenced by entriesin books, and in no other way, and that the millions of dollars
-daily drawn out by checks are also evidenced only by the bank'saccount books after the paid checks have been returned to the
-maker at the end of each month or quarter.In the early days of English law, not only were the jury sup-posed to be able to decide the facts properly from their ownknowledge, but they were supposed to be incompetent to exerciseany discrimination in weighing the testimony of witnesses. Therewas doubtless much ground for this belief when juries were com-posed of peasants unable to read or write. But an intelligentjury of farmers or business men in one of our American courtsare certainly entirely competent to receive hearsay testimony of
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a reliable character, iri a case where no other evidence is available,
and to give due consideration to the circumstances which enhance
or diminish its evidential value. In fact, many judges have
declared that the jury are more competent to weigh and compare
the testimony of laymen of substantially similar education and
character to themselves than is the judge, who is somewhat
removed from the class of the average witness by his position and
training.
If in any State the method of drawing the jury is such that the
jurymen are men lacking in fair intelligence and, common sense,
it would seem to be more desirable to alter the method of select-
ing the jury than to accommodate the rules of evidence to the
capacity of inferior intellects.
In many other respects the practice of our courts has con-
stantly tended to increase the discretion of the trial court.
Thus in cases where evidence is offered of the price paid for
one piece of property in order to enable the jury to fix the value
of another piece, the prevailing and undoubtedly correct rule is
for the trial judge to determine whether the similarity of the two
lots in question is such as to make the evidence fairly reliable, and
likely to help rather than to mislead the jury. So also in cases of
accident by defects in a street or in machinery, the question
whether occurrence or non-occurrence of former injuries is
admissible is determined by the same test of sufficient similarity
of the attending circumstances, which must be applied with broad
discretion by the trial judge. So the question of undue remote-
ness, either on direct or on cross-examination, must be committed
almost wholly to the discretion of the judge.
In many other cases, the question whether the proper founda-
tion has been laid for the introduction of the testimony in question
is settled by the judge, and his decision is final except in case of
gross error.
But the rule excluding hearsay, except as to the recognized
exceptions, has hitherto remained absolutely rigid, however clear
it may be that justice will be defeated by the rejection of reliable
testimony.
Has not the law of the United States reached a point of
maturity where this rigid rule should be made flexible, and the
judge should be trusted with the same right to make exceptions
thereto, which his predecessors of the eighteenth century enjoyed,
and the jury be credited with the ability to take into consideration
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the discount to be given to certain evidence because it is hearsay,
just as they are required every day to discount the value of evi-
dence because the witnesses are biased, are ignorant and stupid,
or are apparently untruthful?
It seems to me that the time has come for another reform, less
radical than that of the i84os, but which should at least modify
the rigidity of the rule excluding hearsay.
Bristol, Conn. Epaphroditus Peck.
